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The purpose of this study is to present an account and analysis of
the International Court of Justice, Because of the lack of information
available, the writer feels that this will give an insight into the
subject.
The methods used are historical, case and analytical. In giving
the background and other pertinent data, the historical method is used.
The analytical and case methods are used in discussing the statutes and
advisory opinions of the Court. ,The materials used were collected from
books, articles, periodicals and public doctiments.
In this study. Chapter II deals with early international judicial
machinery. This includes the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration, the
International Prize Court, and the Permanent Court of International Justice.
The formation and composition of the International Court of Justice are
discussed in Chapter III. Chapter IV deals with the jurisdiction, possi¬
bilities and limitations of the Court. Chapters V, VI, and VII deal with
the statute, cases and advisory opinions of the Court, respectively.
This study is significant because genuine world peace and security
presuppose the existence of justice. But justice is impossible without
machinery, institutions, and processes designed for the pacific adjudi¬
cation of contending claims. Agencies of justice are indispensable to
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the realization of justice in the world conrmunity. In the present world
situation, international justice should take precedence over national
justice since the nations of the world have become more involved with
one another. This involvement leads to cooperation and conflicts among
them. These conflicts must be settled and this can be done only through
institutions of justice.
CHAPTER II
EARLY INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL MACHINERY
The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration
Prior to the institutionalization of arbitral tribunals, there
was only a modicum of appeal to arbitration. Nations resorted to other
means for the adjudication of disputes. Only in the nineteenth century
did the system of arbitration develop and become used with regularity.
EJven then, most arbitral tribunals were ad hoc,^ involving not permanent
machinery for the settlement of international conflicts but agreements
by the nations concerned to submit to an impartial agency created for
the specific and tenq)orary purpose of pacific adjudication. The heart
of ad hoc arrangements is the willingness of the disputants to call
arbitral tribunals into existence.
At the Convention for the Settlement of Arbitral Disputes in 1899,
the Permanent Court of Arbitration was established. This was the greatest
achievement of the Convention. After its establishment, arbitral pro¬
cedures were set up which the States were desirous of employing. On
September 4, 1900, ratifications of the Convention were deposited at the
Hague by seventeen of the signatory States, and the Convention became
^Ad hoc, in this context, means a temporary tribunal created for the
purpose of settling a given dispute.
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effective on that date,^ A second Peace Conference was held at the
Hague in 1907. Its task was to re-examine the 1899 Conference,
The Pemanent Court of Arbitration came into existence under the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The first Convention undertook to
organize the Court and the second to maintain it as established at the
3first Peace Conference.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration consisted mainly of three
bodies. They were a panel of members, an International Bureau and an
Administrative Council. The members of the Court were chosen by those
States which were parties to either of the Hague Conventions, Each
State was allowed to nominate four persons who were competent in the
area of international law, of high moral character and able to accept
the duties of arbitrator. The number of members of the Court progressed
steadily from approximately seventy-five in early years to over 150 in
later years. Because the members never functioned as a body they were
called a panel from which tribunals could be constituted. In its thirty-
three years of existence, out of over 450 members, only twenty-nine
served as members of tribunals,^
The second body, the International Bureau, consisted of a Secretary-
General and a small staff of two secretaries and several subordinate
persons. These persons were always Dutch nationals and, therefore, the
Bureau was not an international body. The function of this organ was to
2
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communicate to the various members concerning tribunal meetings and
manage the archives and administrative duties.^
The final body of the Pemanent Court of Arbitration, the Ad¬
ministrative Council, was composed of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Netherlands and States which were parties to the Conventions.^
This body published the annual report of the Court and performed certain
administrative services.
The Court was financed by its member States, The States were
classed as they wished and paid accordingly. Pa3nnents were made to
the Netherlands government. The system worked because the expenses of
the Court were not very large and no State paid such a large sum as to
be too burdensome,^
In analyzing the Permanent Court of Arbitration, it should first
be noted that the name itself is a misnomer. This factor led public
opinion to expectancies that could not be fulfilled. The Court was not
g
even a tribunal in the true sense of the word. Instead, it was merely
a device which aided in the conducting of arbitral decisions.^ The
Court was permanent only in the sense that it had a permanent Inter¬





Hanley 0. Hudson, The World Court (Boston, 1937), p. 2,
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Because the Court had no true existence as a judicial body, it
possessed no competence. The awards, moreover, of the Court had no
uniform style or serial form.^® Finally, the organs of the Court lacked'
continuity and consistency which would make for a body of cumulative
precedence and in some cases they were not adequately grounded in the
existing law,^^
The International Prize Court
Prior to the proposed creation of the International Prize Court,
neutral nations played only a small part in the arena of international
justice. The creation of the International Prize Court was to enable
the neutral States to be represented. The convention for the setting
up of this Court was held in October, 1907, at which thirty-three States
were instrumental in setting its ratification date for June 30,. 1909.
The ratification, however, never took place.^2
The International Prize Court was planned in almost every detail.
It was to be composed of judges and deputy judges from those States
which were contracted. Though fifteen judges constituted a full court,
nine was a quorum. One of the actions not taken was how the judges
were to be apportioned according to States. According to Article fifteen
of the Convention, there were several States that had the right to appoint
a judge at all times and there were those which could appoint judges by
lOlbod., p. 5.
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Manley 0. Hudson, Permanent Court of International Justice (New
York, 1935), p. 69.
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a method of rotation. States entitled to permanent appointment Included
the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.This
arrangement was defended as being consistent with the principle of equality
of States and as making allowances for differences in the size of naval
and merchant fleets of the various States.
Judges were allotted a certain amount of money to contribute to
their independence in judgment from their home country. They were to
receive financial reimbursement for traveling and a per diem allowance.
The Convention proposed that this Court should have status as the
Permanent Court of Arbitration had. Many of the Permanent Court of Arbi¬
tration's bodies were transferred to the International Prize Court such
as International Bureau and the Secretary-General, Only two officers
were elected by the menibers of the Court. These were the offices of
president and vice president.
Though much effort was put into the formation of the Court, it was
not a great success. There were two major factors which contributed to
its failure. There was not, in the first place, any complete arrangement
as to whose appointees were to serve on the Court. The other factor was
the failure of several nations to sign the Declaration of London,To
be sure, the conception, plan and some of the details have been useful
and suggestive, but it is significant in that with the many advancements
^^anley 0, Hudson, Permanent Court of International Justice (New
York, 1935), p. 70,
^^Ibid.. p. 73.
^^The Declaration of London dealt with Great Britain's proposal as
to the rules which the Court should observe in the absence of a treaty.
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made in international organization since 1919 no suggestion has been
made that such an institution--so tied up with war--is needed in the
twentieth century
The Judicial Arbitration Court
International judicial bodies before 1907 were not permanent.
This was the premise upon which the 1907 Conference was held at the
Hague. The participants felt that a permanent agency should be created
with true judicial characteristics.
k draft was presented at this Conference by the American, British
and German delegations, but it was the Final Act that was the accepted
view of the representatives with the exception of Paraguay and Turkey.
The Conference recommends to the signatory powers
the adoption of the annexed draft convention for the
creation of a court of arbitral justice and the bringing
it into force as soon as an agreement has been reached '
respecting the selection of judges and the constitution
of the Court,
The Court was to meet at the Hague annually. It would have the
services of the Administrative Council and the International Bureau
just as international courts before it. In any cases presented to it,
the Court was to be considered competent. In arbitral cases, three
judges were to sit and act according to the procedure set up by the
Convention, According to the rules of the Court, only contracting
16




States could participate. ° As to the judgments, substantial reasons
were to be presented as to what they were based on.
The chief problem of this Conference was the election of judges.
There were many suggestions such as the nomination of a judge by each
State and the judges themselves elect those to participate. After
many other suggestions, no decisions were reached and the Conference
was abandoned.
Later, efforts were made by the United States to put the draft
convention into effect. Though many other efforts were made through
negotiations, the Court of Arbitral Justice was never established.
However, because of this effort, it was clear that an international
judicial body on this order was needed. The Judicial Arbitration Court
also provided many ideas that could be used in the future.
The Permanent Court of International justice
The next notable step taken in the process of developing an in¬
ternational judiciary was by the League of Nations in 1920, when,
pursuant to Article fourteen of the Covenant, it took steps to establish
the Permanent Court of International Justice.
Article fourteen provides:
The Council shall formulate and submit to the League
for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent
Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent
to hear and determine any dispute of an International
character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court
may also give an advisory opinion on any dispute or question
referred to it by the Council of by the Assembly.19
l^ibid.
^^Permanent Court of International Justice Statute, Article 14,
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In Februairy, 1920, the Council appointed a committee of jurists^®
to prepare a plan to submit to the League members for adoption. The
Committee, following a meeting at the Hague in June and July of that
year, submitted to the Council a draft scheme which, with certain
modifications, was adopted by the Council and with still further amend-
21
ments approved by the Assembly on December 13, 1920, The text was
attached to a protocol on December 16, 1920, for signature and ratifi¬
cation by members of the League. By September, 1921, the requisite
number of States, a majority, had given their approval and the draft
became the Statute of the Pemranent Court of International Justice,
The Statute prescribed the qualifications of the judges, the
method of election and tenure of office, the Court's jurisdiction, its
mode of procedure and other pertinent provisions. The judges must be
qualified in their own country for the highest judicial office or
persons of recognized capacity in inteniational law. Four could be
nominated by the nations which were parties to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration. Only two of those nominated could be fellow nationals of
22their nominators. In the final analysis, only fifteen judges were
elected.
The Court held its first meeting at the Hague, its seat, on
January 30, 1922. The Court's annual meetings were held thereafter un¬
til work was interrupted by World War II. The last meeting, an ad¬
ministrative one, was held in October, 1945.
2®The members of the committee were from Japan, Spain, Brazil, Belgium,
Norway, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United
States.
^^J. L. Brierly. The Law of Nations (Oxford, 1949), p, 253.
^^Ibid., p. 256.
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During its existence, the Court rendered twenty-three judgments
and gave 27 advisory opinions. The Court was open to members of the
League and also to those States mentioned in the annex to the covenant.
The conditions under which it was open to still other States were laid
down by the Council, Acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court was
not compulsory. States were free to decide whether or not they wanted
to bring their disputes to the Court. However, they were privileged,
under the optional clause of Article thirty-six of the Statute to
declare that they recognized as compulsory ipso facto and without
special agreement in relation to other States accepting the same
obligation the jurisdiction of the Court in all or certain specified
categories of dispute. During the entire existence of the Court,
approximately twenty-nine States accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
in various forms. In the same period, forty-seven States signed proto¬
col in 1920, to which the Statute was annexed and all but eight ratified
it.
23
Article 36 states: "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all
cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specifically provided
for the treaties and Convention in force,,..
The members of the League of Nations and States mentioned in the
annex to the Covenant may, either when signing or ratifying the Protocol
to which the present statute is adjoined, or at a later moment, declare
that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agree¬
ment, in relation to any other member or State accepting the same obliga¬
tion, the jurisdiction of the Court in all or any of the classes of
legal disputes concerning (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any
question of international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if
established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
and (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach
of international obligation,"
12
The United States did not become a party to the Statute of
the Permanent Court, although efforts were made by the Secretaries
of State and Presidents during that period. After the failure to
obtain a two-thirds majority vote in the United States Senate, no
further steps were taken. Yet throughout the period a United States
jurist sat on the bench of the Permanent Court of International
Justice
CHAPTER III
THE FORMATION AND COMPOSITION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Following World War II and with the advent of the United Nations
at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in San Francisco, the major issues
were whether or not the Permanent Court of International Justice should
be continued or whether or not a new body should be established.^ Each
Nation represented presented its views on the proposed judicial body.
From these views the International Court of Justice Statute was drawn
up. The Court was featured in the Charter of the United Nations,*
Article ninety-two states:
The International Court of Justice shall be the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, It shall
function in accordance with the annexed statute, which is
based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of Interna¬
tional Justice and forms an Integral part of the Charter.^
Article ninety-three states that all members of the United Nations
are ipso facto parties to the statute and States not members may become
parties on conditions to be determined in each case by the United Nations
3
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council, The
^Daniel S, Cheever, Organizing for Peace (Cambridge, 1954), p, 341,
^United Nations. Charter, Article 91,
3
Yearbook of the United Nations (Lake Success, 1947), p, 33,
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Court consists of fifteen judges elected by the General Assembly upon
the recommendation of the Security Council, No two judges may be
nationals of the same State. They do not have lifetime tenure, but are
elected for periods of nine years and are eligible for re-election.
The seat of the Court is at the Hague, but it holds sessions else¬
where when it is desirable.^ Its first session was held at the Hague
in April and May of 1946.
The Court is a continuing body. The Statute provides that it shall
remain permanent in session, except during judicial vacations. It is
also an autonomous body. It elects a president and a vice president,
appoints a registrar and provides for the appointment of other such
offices and clerical staff as may be necessary. Only the president and
the registrar are required to reside at the Hague.
The justices, who must possess certain specified qualifications,
do not represent the State from which they are chosen. They represent
the international conmiunity of States. They are not selected by the
governments of their States or nominated by them. They are nominated
rather by the national groups that took part in the Permanent Court of
Arbitration or, in the case of States not represented in the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, by national groups appointed for that purpose by
their governments. This procedure is designed to remove the nominations
as far as possible from political considerations.^
^Cheever, op. cit., p. 342.
^J. L. Brierly. The Law of Nations (Oxford, 1949), p. 256.
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Comparable safeguards are placed around the election of judges. The
Statute provides that in such elections the General Assembly and the
Security Council proceed independently of each other and that at every
election the electors should bear in mind that the persons to be elected
should individually possess the qualifications required. In the body
as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and the
£
principal legal systems of the world should be assured. Candidates
who obtain an absolute majority of votes in both the General Assembly
and the Security Council are considered elected.^ Further procedure is
provided for the situation where, after the first meeting for the
purpose of election, one or more seats remain to be filled.
The judges receive annual salaries reasonably commensurate with
their status. But they must be prepared to accept certain inhibitions
such as refraining from all activities incompatible with their judicial
functions. Specifically, they are forbidden to exercise any political
or administrative functions, or engage in any other occupation of a
professional nature. Along with these, they are not permitted to act
O
as agent, counsel or advocate in any case.
The purpose of the Statute is to have at all times a court that
is entirely free from bias or any preconceived notions as to the merits
of any case coming before it. Each member is required, before assuming




his duties, to make a solemn declaration in open court that he will
9
exercise his powers impartially and conscientiously. The judges en-
j[oy diplomatic privileges and immunities whenever they are engaged in
the business of the Court, Members are bound to hold themselves per¬
manently at the disposal of the Court.
While nine judges constitute a quorum, the Statute requires the
full court to sit unless it is expressly provided otherwise.^® The
Court may dispense with the sitting of one or more judges according to
the circumstances and in rotation, provided that the number of available
judges is not thereby reduced below eleven. In practice the full court
sits in all cases except where a judge is disqualified by reason of
some previous connection with the case or is prevented by Illness or
other serious reasons from attending.
No judge may be disqualified unless in the opinion of all the
others he has ceased to fulfill the required conditions necessary. Va¬
cancies resulting from death or otherwise must be filled by the same
method as that laid down for the first election, A member elected to
replace a member whose term of office has not expired holds office for
the remainder of his predecessor's term.
Obviously, since there are only fifteen judges, cases are sometimes
presented by States which have no national on the court. While the
^Brierly, op. cit.. p. 257,
^Qlbid.
^^Norman Hill, International Organization (New York, 1952), p, 260.
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Statute provides that judges of the nationality of each of the parties
retain their right to sit in the case before the Court, it also provides
that, if the Court includes upon the bench no judge of the nationality
of either party, each of the parties may choose a person to sit as judge.
This privilege is frequently exercised. ^ hoc judges receive compensa¬
tion for each day on which they exercise their functions.
The official languages of the Court are French and English; either
may be used by the parties.Written pleadings and oral arguments
presented in one language are translated by the Court's staff into the
other languages. The judgments and opinions are in both official languages.
Cases are brought before the Court either by the notification of
a special agreement concluded by the parties or by the unilateral action
of one of them through a written application addressed to the registrar
of the Court. The proceedings usually consist of the pleadings of the
parties concerned. Oral arguments by counsel follow the written pleadings.
The Court may also hear witnesses and appoint commissions of experts to
make investigations and report vfien necessary.
The deliberations of the Court are in private, but the judgments,
which are by majority vote, are read in open court.Any judge may file
a separate opinion if he does not agree in whole or part with the decision.
Few decisions represent the unanimous opinion of the judges. The judgment
is final and without appeal.
12
International Court of Justice Statute, Article one.
^^ill, op. cit,. p. 254.
CHAPTER IV
JURISDICTION, POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE COURT
The Court's jurisdiction extends no further than those cases
brought before it. If there is a dispute and it is not brought before
the Court, the Court has no jurisdiction. Since individuals are not
considered subjects of international law, they must be represented by
their governments,^^
The Court has jurisdiction over three types of disputes, which
are sometimes called contentious cases. The first of these is that
of cases voluntarily referred to the Court by both parties. This
usually takes place when one nation feels that its rights have been
invaded. The second type involves cases brought by only one party
owing to the provisions of a treaty or convention entered into with one
or more States, Finally, there is the type of case in which one party
brings another to judgment because both have accepted the provision of
Article thirty-six of the Statute which provides for compulsory and
obligatory jurisdiction in legal cases.
The major fault of the Court, however, is that no party can be
brought into court against its will. When the Court was set up, there
^^bid.. p. 255.
^^Daniel S, Cheever, Organizing for Peace (Cambridge, 1954), p. 341,
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was much discussion of this issue. Many of the smaller States wanted
compulsory jurisdiction.^^ Nevertheless, the large or major States
cherished sovereignty or were still suspicious of other States.The
International Court of Justice contains in its Statute an Article on
the issue.
The A^pticle states:
The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases
provided in the United Nations Charter or in treaties
and conventions.... The States parties to the present
statute may declare that they recognize compulsory ipso
facto and without special agreement... in all legal
disputes concerning: interpretation of a treaty; an
question of international law; the existence of any fact
which, if established, would constitute a breach of
international obligation; and the nature or extent of the
reparations to be made for the breach of an international
obligation... , In the event of a dispute as to whether or
not the Court has compulsory jurisdiction, the matter
shall be settled by the Court.
The compulsory jurisdiction of the Court has been accepted in
many cases but there are still a large niunber of States which do
accept the jurisdiction of; the Court only because they have insti¬
tuted a stipulation so that they may not follow the Court's decision
if they are not in agreement. The two major States that favored the
preservation of this option clause are the United States and the Soviet
Union. Recently, however, the United States accepted compulsory juris¬
diction with the exception of the following: "disputes with regard to
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
^°Philip C. Jessup, The Use of International Law (Ann Arbor, 1959),
p. 13.
^^Ibid.
18'International Court of Justice Statute, Article 36
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United States of America as determined by the United States of America.”
The reason the United States insisted on this stipulation was that the
Court might invade fields of vital interest to the United States, includ¬
ing control of the Panama Canal, immigration or tarriff policy. Other
nations that presented stipulations were similar to this one in most
cases. Many nations felt that their national sovereignty was too im¬
portant to have the Court control it.
In contrast to the Permanent Court of International Justice, para¬
graph three of Statute thirty-six seems to give the Court additional
authority. It provides that the Security Council should, as a general
rule, "take into consideration the legal disputes to be referred to by
20the parties to the International Court of Justice," By doing this,
those States that are before the Court will feel obligated to follow its
decision. On the other hand, those cases presented to the Court by the
States which are parties will cause those States that are parties, when
brought before the Court, to refuse to accept the Court's decision.
Another grave limitation of the Court is that even if it did have
compulsory jurisdiction over those cases brought before it, there is no
way in which it can enforce its decisions. The major international body,
the United Nations, cannot help it in this matter either. The major
reason for this is that the international body (the International Court
1 Q
Lawrence Preuss, "The International Court of Justice, the Senate
and Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction," American Journal of International
Law. XX (1946), 669.
90
International Court of Justice Statute, Article 36.
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of Justice is only an organ of the United Nations) is supported by the
States that belong to it and the United Nations has no armed forces by
which it can enforce its decisions, except those loaned to it by the
21member States.
The essential characteristic of law in order to establish a
community is a monopoly of force. In the international community,
where the International Court of Justice is supposedly the supreme law
of the world in reference to nations, this has not been accomplished.
This is not to say, however, that it is not possible. After all, the
achievement of democracy and the abolition of slavery were once conceived
to be impossible.
A grave limitation of the Court is the Security Council, This
body has more power than any other organ of the United Nations. In
almost every case, the first step is the Security Council. This could
be seen developing from the very first case presented to the International
Court of Justice,If this could be alleviated, there is a possibility
that the Court would fair much better.
A final limitation of the Court is that in trying to administer
justice, it has no one to pvinish. The only thing it can do is have damages
reimbursed--if it can do that. Besides, although the States are con¬
sidered equal, they are not equal in reality. The big nations wield
power in every United Nations organ. Because of that, justice cannot,
^^cheever, op. cit,. p, 334.
^^An example of this is the Corfu Channel Case,
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in many cases, be done because no nation wants to cause any of the
major powers to become angry,
In respect to the possibilities of the Court, it seems that its
future is fairly promising. There are several reasons for this obser¬
vation. First of all, even though many nations have only partially
accepted the compulsory clause of the Court, it is a big step in the
right direction. To add to this, it seems that most of the nation's
leaders may abide by the decisions of the Court in order that it will
succeed.
A major factor that will cause the nations, in most cases, to
accept the Court's decisions is that they have witnessed what happened
to the Permanent Court of International Justice and other attempts at
world courts. If they do not accept any of these decisions the Court
will fail. Moreover, living in the nuclear age, nations will try to
accept the Court's decision as often as possible.
Success of the International Court of Justice, then, depends upon
the nations that are parties to it. If they do not accept the decisions
of the Court, it is doomed--if they do--it will succeed.
23
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CHAPTER V
THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
The Statute of the International Court of Justice was discussed
and analyzed many times at the San Francisco Conference about seven¬
teen years ago. Those then present felt that the results of their
discussion and analysis were the best that could be done. In many
instances, they were and still are correct, but since then, there
are many things that should be changed along with those things that
should go unchanged.
Article two, which discusses the selection of judges, is, in all
probability,,the best method of selection possible. If any other method
were used, the Court might not be able to do the job that it does.
The number of members of the Court is good because it provides
for a diversification of ideas and methods of solving the many problems
that are presented to them in the form of cases. The nationality of
the judge should not be considered because, there may^be, for example, two
judges of greater ability from one nation and only one of these can be
selected. This is not saying that all judges should come from the same
country. Instead, if there are a number of judges from one nation, pos¬
sibly two or three, who are more qualified than those from other nations,
all should be elected. There should, however, be a limit on the niuiiber
that one nation could have in order that a monopoly would be prevented.
23
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According to Articles five, six, seven and eight of the Court's
Statute, States that were members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
should, at least three months before the election, nominate persons to
fill vacancies. A nation may nominate as many as four persons of its
nationality,^ A list is then prepared by the Secretary-General and
submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council. Independently
the two groups proceed to elect the judges. If, instead of this, the
judges were elected by only the General Assembly, there would probably
be a lesser possibility of the Major Powers putting into office the
representatives they want,'^
The judges of the Court are elected for nine years and can be
re-elected. If it happens that a judge's term expires before a majority
vote is taken,, the judge must continue to carry out the-duties he has
been performing. In order to insure greater independence of the judges,
3
they should be electedJor life terms instead of for nine years. This
tenure could be ended, however, by a unanimous decision of the other
members of the Court when it is definitely seen that they cannot perform
their task sufficiently.
According to Article thirty-five of the Statute, the Court is open
to States that are parties to the statute and to States that have been
given permission by the Security Council, This should not be a definite





rule. Instead, access to the Court should be available to the United
Nations, specialized agencies, regional organizations authorized by the
General Assembly, and individuals and public organizations in certain
cases on appeal frcxn regional courts. Perhaps this should be done in
order that all cases of international scope could be brought before the
International Court of Justice, A question may arise as to how cases
not presented by nations could be international. This can be proven by
the fact that persons and private organizations are subject to be mis¬
treated by nations in their activities.
There are several categories, according to some commentators, in
which the jurisdiction of the Court should be made compulsory. These
include:
In any dispute relating to the interpretation of the
Charter; any dispute relating to the constitutionality,
interpretation and application of any law, regulation or .
decision made or adopted under the Charter; any dispute
relating to legal questions involving an international
dispute or situation.,,; any dispute relating to the
interpretation or application of the specialized agencies;
any dispute relating to the interpretation and application
of treaties and other Instruments of the United Nations
Charter; and any dispute relating to the validity of a
treaty or international agreement.,..^
If these were binding, it is possible that the Court's jurisdiction
would be extended. Moreover, it would give the Court a chance to gain
the power it needs to become the supreme judicial organ of the world.
In addition to the suggested revisions mentioned in relation to
the Court's jurisdiction, the judgments of the Court should be enforced
Ibid,. p. 337.
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by the methods adopted by the General Assembly,^ By the use of these
methods of enforcing its decisions, the Court will attain the power and




The International Court of Justice has rendered many decisions.
In order to illuminate the business of the Court, we are going to
present two cases. The case studies will be suggestive of the types
of issues, procedures and the kinds of decisions. The Corfu Channel and
the Nottebohn are the two illustrative cases. These two cases were
selected because they best represent the decisions of the Court. The
Corfu Channel case is one which involves nations, both big and small.
It also shows a decision that was not followed. The Nottebohn case
involves a person who contended that his case is an international one.
One of the States which Nottebohn claimed to be his legal residence,
Liechtenstein, brought the case to the Court. This decision was complied
with.
The Corfu Channel case was presented to the Security Council some
time before it was brought before the Court. In April of 1947, however,
a vote was taken by the Security Council to submit the case to the
Court. The resolution was carried.
The Corfu Channel case involved a dispute between the United
Kingdom and the Albanian government. The claim of the United Kingdom
was:
That the Albanian government either caused to be
laid or had knowledge of the laying of mines in its
territorial waters in the Strait of Corfu, without
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notifying the existence of the mines according to
article three and four of the Hague Convention (eight)
of 1907, by the principles of international law and
by the ordinary dictates of humanity; that two destroyers and
fourty-four lives of the Royal Navy were lost; that the
loss was due to the failure of the Albanian government to
fulfill its international obligation; that the Court should
decide that the Albania was internationally responsible;
and that the Court should determine the reparation and
compensation,^
The United Kingdom contended that the Court had Jurisdiction in
the case under Article thirty-six of its statute. The United Kingdom
also contended that the case had been referred to the Court by the
Security Council on the basis of this statute,
The Albanian government received on May 22, 1947, the notification
of the Registrar of the Court that it should appear in court. The
Albanian government replied on July 23, 1947, by letter to the Registrar.
It stated that the Albanian government did not feel that the Court was
justified because it had not complied with the ruling of the Security
Council, It also stated that the United Kingdom should have reached
an understanding with the Albanian government before taking the matter
to the Court. The Albanian government, the letter continued, fully
accepted the recommendation of the Security Council and was prepared to
O
appear before the Court. However, the letter concluded by saying that
the Albanian government accepted with reservations and stated that the
acceptance of the Court's decision could not constitute further precedence.




The Court then proceeded to set up dates for the issues to be
presented. The dates set were October 1, and December 10, 1947, for
the United Kingdom and the Albanian government, respectively.
The United Kingdom presented its Memorial^ which contained the
incidents that occurred when its ships were destroyed in the Corfu
Channel on October 22, 1946, The Albanian government presented its
Counter-Memorial^ on the date set which stated its preliminary objections
on grounds that it had not admitted the ships into the Channel, This
objection was presented to the United Kingdom and it, in turn, presented
a statement of observations and submissions.^ The argument of the
United Kingdom was that the preliminary objections of the Albanian
government should be dismissed and that the Albanian government should
submit a Counter-Memorial on the merits of the dispute without any
further delay.
The Court, at the time, did not have a judge of Albanian nationality.
A judge which fulfilled the necessary qualifications was provided by
the Albanian government.
On March 25, 1948, the Court delivered its first judgment. It
rejected the objection of the Albanian government on grounds that the
Albanian government had, in its letter of acceptance, accepted the juris¬
diction of the Court voluntarily and indisputably. Because the letter
of acceptance by the Albanian government referred only to future precedence
4
This term means the issues of the plaintiff,
^This term means the issues of the defendant.
^Lester B. Orfield, Cases and Materials on International Law
(Indianapolis, 1955), p, 611,
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of the case, the Court held that the preliminary objections of the
A.lbanian government were overruled. The dates were then set for the
Counter-Memorial of Albania, the reply of the United Kingdom and the
rejoinder of Albania,^
The vice president of the Court and seven other judges, while
agreeing with the decision, stated in a separate opinion of the judg¬
ment that the Court should have also passed upon the merits of the
United Kingdom's claims which stated that the case fell within the
O
area of compulsory jurisdiction. The judge from Albania stated that
he could not concur in the judgment of the Court and stated a separate
opinion.
After this decision, the two governments presented the two
questions posed by the Security Council, They were:
(1) Is Albania responsible under international law
for the explosions...and loss of human life and is there
any duty of compensation? (2) Has the United Kingdom
violated national sovereignty of the Albanian Peoples
Republic.,.?®
The Court reached a decision on March 25, 1948. By a vote of four¬
teen to two, it gave judgment that the United Kingdom did not violate
the sovereignty of the Peoples Republic of Albania by reason of the acts
of the British Navy in Albanian waters. And, by a unanimous decision,
it gave judgment that by reason of the acts of the British Navy in
Albanian waters in the course of operation on November 12 and 13, 1946,




the United Kingdom violated the sovereignty of the Peoples Republic of
Albania,^®
In analyzing this case, there are certain factors that are to be
noted. The first of these is the tenure of judges. In the case of
the judge from Albania, it seems that because of his closeness to his
country, he could not objectively come to a conclusion in the case. On
the other hand, it could just as well have been possible that the other
judges were partial to the United Kingdom in that the United Kingdom
was a member of the "Big Five." We can never be entirely certain of
the reasons why the judges voted the way they did.
A second point is that before the case was presented to the
Security Council or the Court, the United Kingdom had used minesweepers
to remove the minefield. It was also discovered later that the Communists
in the area put the mines there.
In the final analysis, however, the Court did make decisions in
favor of both parties. Later, Albania was asked to pay reparations for
the damage done. The Albanian government bluntly refused. Even though
the Court insisted that it had compulsory jurisdiction in the case, it
had no way of enforcing its decision.
The Nottebohn Case concerned a German national who was born in
Germany in 1891 and naturalized in Liechtenstein in 1939,^^ In 1935,
Nottebohn became a resident of Guatamala and remained in business there.
He made both business and pleasure trips to Germany, After visiting his
^°Ibid.
^^William W. Bishop. International Law (Boston, 1962), p, 401,
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brother in Liechtenstein, he applied for naturalization through his
attorney on October 9, 1939, after the outbreak of World War II, Under
Liechtenstein law, the applicant had to prove that his acceptance into
the "home corporation" of a Liechtenstein commune had been promised, that
he would lose his former nationality (though this was not always the case),
that he had resided in the territory for at least three years and paid
the required fees.12
Nottebohn sought and received dispensation of the residence require¬
ment, paid the special fees and in 1939, completed naturalization. He
then got a Guatamalan passport and returned to Guatemala.
After Guatamala entered World War II against Germany, he was taken
lO
into custody and removed to the United States as a dangerous enemy alien.
Nottebohn had to remain there until 1946, His property was confiscated
during the time. Liechtenstein brought action against the Guatamalan
government for a breach of its obligation in international law. Guatamala
asked the Court to declare the claim inadmissible on the grounds of the
nationality of the claimant,
According to the government of Liechtenstein, it could, just as
any other State, set up the qualifications for a person to become a
citizen there. Therefore, if a national is in another State, that State






The issue before the Court was not the legality of the naturali¬
zation policies but the question of whether or not the Guatamalan
government violated international law in its treatment of the Liech¬
tenstein national.When the Liechtenstein government performed the
act of naturalization, this fell within its domestic jurisdiction and,
according to international law, other governments must obey the rules
of international law by treating other citizens on the basis of those
rules provided by international law.
Another issue was whether the naturalization conferred on
Nottebohn can be successfully invoked against Guatamala. When two
States have conferred its nationality upon the same individual, each of
the States may adhere to its own point of view and act accordingly.
Whatever the State does is within its own jurisdiction. In many cases
of dual nationality, a third nation is brought in or rather its courts
16
are used to decide the issue of international law that is prevailing.
To study the case more closely, it is necessary to review the
situation leading up to presentation to the Court in order that the
following question may be answered:
At the time of his naturalization does Nottebohn
appear to have been more closely attached by his tradi¬
tion, his establishment, his interests, his activities,
his family ties, his intentions for the near future to





There are certain facts that seem to be essential in the record
of Nottebohn. First of all, Nottebohn was and had been since birth a
German national until he became a naturalized citizen of Liechtenstein.
Even after becoming a citizen of that country, he continued to associate
himself with his friends, family and business associates after the war
had begun,At that time there seemed to be nothing to indicate that
Nottebohn wanted to disassociate himself from Germany.
Living in Guatamala for thirty four years, he carried on activities
of a normal nature. It seemed as though his main interests were in that
country. He returned to Guatamala soon after his naturalization was
completed and remained there until he was removed to the United States
19
during the war. After the war, he sought to return there but was re¬
fused admission into the country.
Nottebohn's connections with Liechtenstein are fairly interesting.
He was there for a short period in which he became naturalized. His
application confirmed the transient character of the visit by his request
20
that proceedings take place without delay. He gave no intention of
settling in Liechtenstein any time during his visit and as soon as he
had completed his naturalization, he applied and received a visa to
return to Guatamala. He remained there until he was removed to the United
States in 1943. The reason that Nottebohn went to Liechtenstein when






not allow his readmission into the country.
No reasons were presented on his application for the waiver of
the residence requirement in Liechtenstein. It should also be noted
that Nottebohn had stated to members of his family that he desired to
spend his old age in Guatemala.
The facts presented were;
On the one hand, the absence of any bond of attach¬
ment between Nottenbohn and Liechtenstein and, on the
other hand, the existence of a long-standing and close
connection between him and Guatamala, a link which his
naturalization in no way weakened. That naturalization
was not based on any real prior connection with
Liechtenstein, nor did it in any way alter the manner
of life of the person upon whom it was conferred in ex-
OBptfbhal circumstances of speed and accommodation. In
both respects, it was lacking in the genuineness requi¬
site in an act of such importance, if it is to be
entitled to be respected by a State in the position of
Guatamala. It was granted without regard to concept
of nationality adopted in international relations.21
Other data presented were;
Guatamala is under no obligation to recognize a
nationality granted in such circumstances. Liechtenstein
consequently is not entitled to extend its protection to
Nottebohn vis-a-vis Guatamala and its claim must be held
as inadmlssable....22
For the above reasons, the Court, by eleven votes to three, held
that the claims submitted by the government of Liechtenstein were in¬
admissible.
In looking at this case, there is one issue of international





problem of dual nationality can clearly be seen as a basic reason for
conflicts among nations, especially during and immediately following
wars. Perhaps it is during this time that an individual should, more
than at any other, declare his allegiance for one country. When this
does not happen, there is an additional amount of conflict as was between
Guatamala and Liechtenstein.
If Liechtenstein had, however, followed the rule of international
law in naturalizing Nottebohn, the problem would not have come about.
This case is clearly one that falls under the jurisdiction of international
law (according to Article thirty-six of the International Court of Justice
which was stated earlier).
The Court's decision, in contrast to the first case presented, even
though the Liechtenstein government, was not satisfied with it,was ac¬
cepted. This contrast shows the progress the Court made from the first
case to the second. In both cases, however, there is still much that
can be done to improve international law as handed down by the Inter¬
national Court of Justice. Since that time, decisions have been both
accepted and rejected. Out of the total number, it seems that the
majority of the decisions, even though small, have been accepted. This
is certainly a giant step in international justice.
CHAPTER VII
ADVISORY OPINIONS
In addition to contentious cases, that is, cases involving dis¬
putes between States, the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction
over matters referred to it as advisory opinions.^ In the United Nations
Charter, an article provides that the Security Council and the General
Assembly may request an advisory opinion on any issue classified as a
legal question. The various other organs of the United Nations may also
request advisory opinions, but they must first have the permission of
the General Assembly. These issues, however, must fall in the area of
legal questions.
The process of the Court in handling questions submitted for
advisory opinions follows the same process in the handling of cases
submitted for its judgment. The United Nations Secretary-General and
governments are invited to present their views in briefs or orally on
the questions being considered. Just as the States that are Involved
in a case are permitted to have an ^ hoc judge on the Court when there
is not one already present, the case also holds true for advisory
opinions. After hearing statements by Interested governments and others
authorized to submit views such as the United Nations Secretary-General,




the Court prepares its advisory opinions as it does judgments,^
The International Court of Justice may, at any time, refuse to give
its opinion on the questions asked. The Court has done this only in
cases that have been presented to it that do not fall under the heading
of legal or under the Court's jurisdiction. Under the Permanent Court
of International Justice, this problem was much more prevalent because
the Issues presented were not restricted to the area of legal matters.
A grave difficulty was overcome when the United Nations made this stipu-
q
lation in its Charter,
Since the establishment of the International Court of Justice
there have been many issues presented to it for advisory opinion. The
first of these was the admission of States to the United Nations which
took place in 1948, for the first time. At that time, the issue came
about when a dispute arose between the United States and the Soviet Union
over the admission of several new States to the United Nations. The Court
was then submitted two questions:
(1) In casting its vote, could a dtate require the
conditions be met by the state requesting admission
other than those specified in the Charter? (2) Can a state
lay down as a condition that it would vote for admission
of a state if other states were admitted for membership?^
According to the United Nations Charter only those nations that
are peace-loving and willing to abide by the principles of the United
Nations should be admitted. The reasons stated by several members for
^Ibid.. p, 266.
%ill, op. cit.. p. 262.
Leonard, op. cit.. p. 266
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not wanting to allow the nations (China, for example) to be admitted
were that they did not maintain diplomatic relations with the applying
State and that they had aided the enemy in World War II.^
After many members of the United Nations and the Secretary-General
asked the Court to give negative answers to the questions, the Court,
by a vote of seven to six with two concurring opinions, answered both
questions negatively. The Court's decisions, however, were not complied
with and did not settle the dispute between the East and the West on this
issue.^
A second question presented to the International Court of Justice
for an advisory opinion concerned the reparation of injuries, suffered
in the service of the United Nations.
In December of 1948, Count Folk Bernadotte was assassinated In Palestine
while serving as a mediator for the United Nations.^ The Security Council
immediately asked the Court's opinion on two questions:
(1) When a state is responsible for an injury to a
United Nations employee while on official duty, can the
United Nations press a claim against that state for
damages to the United Nations and to the victim? (2) If
answered in the affirmative, would this affect the rights
of the state of which the victim is a national to press
a claim?8
The Court's decision was that the United Nations could press a claim
against Palestine for its damages while the victim was in the service of
^Ibid.. p. 267.
^Ibid.
^Cheever, op. cit.. p, 345.
Q
Leonard, op. cit.. p. 267.
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the United Nations. The amount of the claim would be based on the breach
of the obligation of the victim to the United Nations. The victim may
also press a claim in a case such as this. On the basis of the Court's
decision, Israel paid damages to the United Nations for the death of
Q
Count Bernadotte.^
Competence of the General Assembly regarding the admission of States
to the United Nations is another issue that has been presented to the
Court for its advisory opinion. This request grew out of a deadlock in
the Security Council because of Soviet vetoes. The question presented
was; Could the General Assembly, over the Soviet veto, admit new members
to the United Nations?^^ The Court gave its opinion in November of 1949,
which was in the negative.
A fourth issue presented to the Court were the peace treaties with
Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Several members of the United Nations
protested that human rights had been violated in these three satellites
of the Soviet Union. The General Assembly then asked for an interpre¬
tation of the treaties that they were a part of. The questions, were:
(1) Do the diplomatic exchanges between the three
states and certain other powers disclose disputes subject to
the provisions for the settlement of disputes contained
in the treaties? (2) If so, are the three countries ob¬
ligated to appoint their representatives to the treaty
commission for settling the disputes? (3) If so, and
if these countries should not appoint their representa¬
tives within a reasonable period, does the Secretary-
General have authority under the treaties to appoint the
third member of each commission? (4) If so, would the
^Ibid.
^^Cheever, op. cit.. p. 345.
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commission so composed be competent to make a definite
and binding decision in settlement of a dispute?
The answers to the first two questions were positive and were
given on March 30, 1950, The reason was based on the view of the United
Nations in respect for human rights. The third and fourth decisions
were ordered in June of 1950, In answer to the third, the Court stated
that the Secretary-General was not authorized to appoint a third
12member of the commission. With this answer, it was unnecessary to
give the fourth because it was based on the third one,
South-West Africa's international status is the final issue to be
presented here. The question arose when the Union of South Africa re-
13
fused to place South-West Africa under the trusteeship system. On
December 6, 1949, the General Assembly requested the advisory opinion
of the Court for a clarification of the status of the area. The
questions before the Court were:
(1) Does the Union of South Africa continue to have
international obligation under the mandate for South-
West Africa, and if so, what are those obligations?
(2) Are the trusteeship provisions of the Charter
applicable, and if so in what manner? (3) Has the
Union of South Africa the competence to modify the inter¬
national status of the territory of South-West Africa,
or, in the event of a negative reply, where does compe¬
tence rest to determine and modify the international
status of the territory?!^
The Court, in September, 1950, presented its opinion to the General
Assembly. It foxmd that the Union of South Africa still had the same
^^Leonard, op, cit.. p, 268,
^^Cheever, op. cit.. p, 346,
^^eonard, op, cit.. p, 269.
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international obligations as it had under the League of Nations Covenant
even though the League no longer existed,However, the Court continued,
the Union of South Africa did not have to submit to the trusteeship agree¬
ment as it did under the League Covenant. It further stated that neither
the United Nations nor the Union of South Africa, could modify the inter-
16
national status of South-West Africa.
Even though the Court has advised on minor issues--major issues
are almost never brought to the Court--they do contribute to a more
peaceful coimmmity by settling problems that cause needless conflict.
It is, nevertheless, true that the States in their inequality, alike
socially, politically and economically, provide an uneasy foundation on
which to erect an international court with all-enibracing jurisdiction
over cases of this nature.
Advisory opinions are important in that they provide a legal basis
for the decisions that are actually made by the General Assembly and the
Security Council. Nations, like persons, are 'most likely to agree with the
Court's decision than with a non-judicial body of men. These opinions are
limited because the organs which request them do not have to follow them.
Seemingly, when this happens, the Court's position is jeopardized. The






International courts came into existence during the latter part
of the nineteenth century. The first three courts were, in large part,
failures. However, it seems that each Court profited by the mistakes
of those that existed before it. The result of the efforts is the
International Court of Justice.
The International Court of Justice's existence covers a period of
eighteen years which is almost the length of the entire life of the
longest lived court--the Permanent Court of International Justice, Of
all the problems of the Court, that of enforcing decisions is the pre¬
dominant one. Many States feel that they cannot comply with decisions
even though the Court acted justly.
Nations use the Court, and the United Nations as well to embarrass
each other. Ijiis may be done by direct or indirect action. An example
of this is that the United States brought the Soviet satellite countries
into court in 1950. This was the case concerning Bulgaria, Hungary and
Rumania, which was discussed in the advisory opinions.
The limited jurisdiction of the Court impedes its progress in
many respects. Cases involving pressing issues have been brought before
the Court. Due to the Court's jurisdiction being definitely stated in
the Statute, it cannot handle many of them.
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In the United Nations, there are too many bodies that can handle
cases. The Security Council, General Assembly and the International
Court of Justice all have the authority to decide cases that are brought
before them. The Court, many times, assists in these decisions through
advisory opinions. Instead of this, the Court should be able to decide
on all issues presented to the United Nations in general. The reason
is that the other organs of the United Nations have a tendency to be
more partial than the Court. This is true because most nations in these
organs have the interests of their own country at heart and this causes
a grave problem in the objective settlement of international disputes.
In looking at the past, there seem to be several factors that have
caused the failure of courts. The first is a major war which contributed
to the failure of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The
second is non-compliance with court rulings. Finally, the judges are
partial to the wants of the Great Powers.
The success of the Court would, then, in all probability, depend
on these same issues only in the reverse. Several other factors, however,
can be added. The first of these is that of enlarging the jurisdiction
t
of the Court so that it may operate more effectively. In many cases the
Court cannot decide at all. Another is that the tenure of the judges
should be changed from nine years to life. This would enable the judges
to feel more a part of the international organ. With these changes, it
seems that the Court would come into its own.
At present, the Court is as successful as it can be under the cir¬
cumstances, If the prescribed changes were made, perhaps the world would
be on its way to a more positive community of nations that is a true
community in every sense of the word.
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